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 
Abstract— The underlying causes of xenophobia are complex 
and varied. Xenophobia has to do with contemptuous of that which 
is foreign, especially of strangers or of people from different 
countries or cultures. Unemployment and mounting poverty among 
South Africans at the bottom of the economic ladder have provoked 
fears of the competition that better educated and experienced 
migrants can represent. South Africa’s long track-record of violence 
as a means of protest and the targeting of foreigners in particular; 
and, the documented tensions over migration policy and the scale of 
repatriation serve a very good explanation for its xenophobia. It was 
clear that while most of the attacks were directed against foreign, 
primarily African, migrants, that this was not the rule. Attacks were 
also noted against Chinese-speakers, Pakistani migrants as well as 
against South Africans from minority language groups (in the conflict 
areas). Settlements that have recently experienced the expression of 
‘xenophobic’ violence have also been the site of violent and other 
forms of protest around other issues, most notably service delivery. 
The failure of government in service delivery was vexed on this form 
of xenophobia (HSRC, 2008). 
Due to the increase in migration, this conflict is certainly not 
temporary in nature. Xenophobia manifests in different regions and 
communities, with devastating effects on the affected nationals. 
Nigerians living in South Africa have been objects of severe attacks 
and assault as a result of this xenophobic attitude. It is against this 
background that this study seeks to investigate the xenophobic 
attacks against Nigerians in South Africa. The methodology is 
basically qualitative with the use of secondary sources such as 
Books, Journals, Newspapers and internet sources. 
 
 
Keywords—Nigeria, Poverty, South Africa, Unemployment,   
Xenophobia,  
                                                          
Fayomi Oluyemi is with the Political Science and International Relations 
Department, Covenant University, PMB 1023, Ota, Ogun State, Nigeria. 
(phone: +2348033342415; e-mail: nike.fayomi@covenantuniversity.edu.ng).  
C. Ayo is with the Computer And Information Sciences Department, 
Covenant University, PMB 1023, Ota, Ogun State, Nigeria. 
(e-mail: charles.ayo@covenantuniversity.edu.ng).  
    F.Chidozie is with the Political Science and International Relations 
Department, Covenant University, PMB 1023, Ota, Ogun State, Nigeria. (e-
mail: felix.chidozie@covenantuniversity.edu.ng).  
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The perennial spate of attacks on foreign-owned shops in 
some South African townships raises uncomfortable 
questions about xenophobia in South Africa. 
This attitude generated the questions which include: To 
what extent can South Africa's inconsistent immigration 
policy be blamed for xenophobia? Do foreigners really 'steal' 
South African jobs? Do foreign-owned small businesses have 
an unfair advantage over those owned by South Africans? 
Xenophobia is becoming a prominent aspect of life in 
Africa. From Kenya to the Maghreb and across Southern 
Africa, discrimination against non-nationals, particularly 
fellow Africans, has been on the rise according to 
international media reports. 
However, Crush (2008) states that exclusion, based on the 
idea of being 'non-native' has existed in Africa since 
independence (and was codified during colonialism). 
Bounded ideas of citizenship have existed in Africa for two 
centuries, and contemporary xenophobia can be seen as one 
of the most recent manifestations of this feature. 
South Africa is extremely high with regular attacks on 
foreign nationals. Despite a lack of directly comparable data, 
xenophobia in South Africa is perceived to have significantly 
increased after the installation of a democratic government in 
1994. According to a 2004 study published by the Southern 
Africa Migration Project (SAMP), The ANC government, in its 
attempts to overcome the divides of the past and build new 
forms of social cohesion embarked on an aggressive and 
inclusive nation-building project. One unanticipated by-
product of this project has been a growth in intolerance 
towards outsiders. Violence against foreign citizens and 
African refugees has become increasingly common and 
communities are divided by hostility and suspicion (SAMP, 
2004).  
Xenophobia is a dislike and/or fear of that which is 
unknown or different from one. It comes from the Greek 
words (xenos), meaning “stranger,” “foreigner” and (Phobos), 
and meaning “fear.” The term is typically used to describe a 
fear or dislike foreigners or of people significantly different 
from oneself, usually in the context of visibly differentiated 
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minorities (Shinsana,2008). It is more broadly defined in the 
Dictionary of Psychology (1978) as “a fear of strangers”. 
Post apartheid South Africa has enjoyed about two decades 
of majority rule on the basis of a constitution which declares, 
as one of its fundamental principles and goals, the 
“achievement of a non-racial society”. However, in spite of 
the efforts to create “the rainbow nation”, neither the 
question of race nor the questions of class and gender 
oppression and exploitation have ceased to be central in 
contemporary South Africa (Gqola, 2001 cited in Hendricks, 
2005:103; Trimikliniotis et al, 2008).   Indeed, the defeat of 
apartheid, the bastion of state-organized racism, a regime 
based explicitly on racist institutionalization, and its 
replacement by the “new South Africa” is indicative of how 
race and racism remain operational forces even after they 
have officially been declared dead. There is no consensus as 
to the current transitional state of affairs; for 20 years after 
African National Congress (ANC) took over from white 
nationalist/racist minority rule, there is considerable debate 
as to the direction, pace and nature of the post-apartheid 
regime (Trimikliniotis et al, 2008). 
To be sure, the issue of xenophobic relations in contemporary 
South Africa is rooted in and conditioned by the structure of 
its apartheid economy. The apartheid economy was a 
totalizing one, in that it mobilized all the social forces at its 
disposal to further the interest of the apartheid South African 
state. Since the primary productive force in the apartheid 
South African economy was gold and the concomitant social 
relations of the mining process was by mostly black labour 
force, the industry attracted heavy migrant labour from 
Southern African regions notably Zimbabweans, Malawians 
and Mozambicans to the fast thriving industry. The 
immediate result of this was that, as the foreign labour force 
began to gain social mobility in the gold industry and the 
black South Africans continually subjected to the repressive 
policies of apartheid, social tensions rose in the political 
economy of the state and has since remained a dominant 
part of the social relations of the post-apartheid South 
African state (Konanani and Odeku, 2013; Chidozie, 2014). 
 
Lester et al (2000) had argued that, while for the first time 
democratization in South Africa has translated to the poor 
having the same formal political power as the rich, the 
country remains one of the most unequal societies on earth. 
This gross inequality was engendered, according to him, by 
the fact that, when the country left apartheid behind, it did 
not leave behind the structures and processes which 
generated inequality. This problem continues to dominate 
contemporary discourse on the nature of post-apartheid 
economy in South Africa. 
Thus, this contradiction in the social relations of apartheid, 
resulting in limited opportunities for blacks in South Africa 
fuels fear and suspicions among the majority of them, 
especially for foreigners. The mounting poverty and 
unemployment rate among the majority of the South African 
blacks have intensified in post-apartheid South Africa 
prompting the various governments to initiate economic 
reforms to reverse the trend. Hence, even though policies 
such as the Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
Programme (GEAR) and Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) 
came under heavy attack, especially from the white minority 
in South Africa, it nonetheless, portrayed government’s 
genuine intervention to redress racial (mis)representation in 
the country’s political economy (Alozieuwa, 2009; Edigheji, 
2012).  
But the efforts of the government are not enough as 
indicated by the report released by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) in 2003. The report 
concluded that: 
Human Development Index has 
worsened (from 0.73 in 1994 to 0.067 in 
2003), poverty still engulfs 48.5% of the 
population (21.9 million in 2002), 
income inequality has increased (from 
0.60 in 1995 to 0.63 in 2001), the 
majority of households have limited 
access to basic services, and the official 
unemployment rate has sharply 
increased to more than 30% in 2003 
(UNDP report, 2003:3, cited in 
Hendricks, 2005:104).   
 
However, the deep economic cleavage in post-apartheid 
South becomes pronounced when the rising influx of “other 
foreigners”, especially Nigerians and their active role in the 
economy of South Africa comes under scrutiny. According to 
the report of an oral interview conducted in 2013, Salifu of 
the Institute for Securities Studies (ISS), South Africa, 
estimated that there are about 13 million Nigerians living in 
South Africa while about 1 million South Africans are living in 
Nigeria. She argued that the implication of these figures is 
that, rather than portend an advantage for the South African 
economy, as many believe, there is instead a huge tension in 
the South African economy which has resulted in xenophobia 
in recent times (Salifu, oral interview, 2013).  
 
In effect, recent waves of xenophobic attacks on Nigerians 
living in South Africa bring into stark reality the 
preponderance of Nigerian business community in post 
apartheid South African economy. The attacks in which more 
than 60 persons were killed and thousands displaced 
attracted diplomatic intervention by the Nigerian state. Even 
though no Nigerian was killed in that wake of the violent 
xenophobic attack, many lost their properties and their shops 
were looted; an indication of an orchestrated attack on the 
businesses of Nigerians in South Africa (Alli, 2008:1). 
 
To this end, the mass protest by South African women 
married to Nigerians in August 2013 on the street of 
Johannesburg under the aegis of the United Nigerian Wives in 
South Africa (UNWISA), an umbrella organization established 
to protect their interest becomes very pertinent. The group 
  
gathered to fight against alleged stigmatization, 
discrimination, and humiliation by government departments, 
agencies and officials of the South African state. The protest 
march which eventually ended at the city of Johannesburg 
home affairs office, threatened to continue in Nigeria with 
the intention of persuading the Nigerian government to react 
by stopping South African businesses operating in Nigeria 
(Vanguard Editorials, August 13 & 14, 2013:6 & 9). To be sure, 
the Nigerian government chose to be cautious and observe 
proceedings before making official statement on the matter, 
since the event had occurred shortly after a major diplomatic 
strain in her relations with South Africa over yellow fever 
cards. 
 
In view of this background, the paper interrogates the 
retrospective effects of xenophobia on South Africa-Nigeria 
relations given the dynamism that governs the countries’ 
diplomatic engagements in recent time. The paper is divided 
into five parts. Following the introduction, the second part 
covers a historical overview of Nigeria-South Africa relations. 
The third section presents a literature review on Xenophobia 
in South Africa. The fourth part narrows the discussion to 
specific case study analysis of xenophobic attacks on 
Nigerians in South Africa. The last section concludes the work 
and proffers relevant policy recommendations. 
 
Historical Overview of Nigeria-South Africa Relations 
  
The history of Nigeria-South Africa relations could be traced 
to events arising from the Sharpeville massacre of 21
st
 March, 
1960, when the South African police shot and killed 72 blacks 
and wounded 184 (Wilmot, 1980:9; Zabadi and Onuoha, 
2012:439; Akinboye, 2013:18). This event which occurred 
even before Nigeria’s independence marked the beginning of 
Nigeria’s confrontation against white South Africa. The 
Tafawa Balewa government (1960-1966) upon assumption of 
office in October 1, 1960 was faced with overwhelming 
pressure from both domestic and external sources to institute 
measures to check South Africa’s apartheid policies.  
 
Consequently, Nigeria banned the importation of South 
African goods into the country and was instrumental to the 
political and economic sanctions passed against the racist 
regime. Furthermore, Balewa went to the Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers’ Conference in March 1961 in London, where 
he spearheaded the move that led to the withdrawal of South 
Africa from the Commonwealth (Aluko, 1982; Ajala, 1986 & 
1993). By 1962, Nigeria terminated all the privileges of 
Commonwealth membership which South Africans enjoyed in 
Nigeria. Nigeria government’s anti-apartheid policy continued 
until the first republic was ousted by Major Nzeogwu-led 
military coup in January 15, 1966.  
 
The military coup of January 15, 1966 which seized power 
from the Balewa’s regime brought Aguiyi Ironsi’s transition to 
the helm of affairs. The brief administration of General Ironsi 
between January-July 1966 did not record any substantial 
policy against the apartheid regime in South Africa, due 
largely to the volatile security situation in Nigeria that was 
precipitated by the coup (Ademoyega, 1981). 
 
Following the take-over of the reins of government in Nigeria 
in July 29, 1966 by the military-led administration of Yakubu 
Gowon after the assassination of General Aguiyi Ironsi, a 
slightly modified policy towards South Africa was adopted. 
The new policy which was based on boycott and 
confrontation with white minority regime in South Africa led 
to a proclamation declaring white South Africans prohibited 
immigrants in Nigeria. The Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970 
further deepened the conflict in Nigeria-South Africa 
relations, upon realization that South Africa was sabotaging 
the effort of Nigeria in the war. Yakubu Gowon strengthened 
his anti-apartheid policy as a result, and this was continued 
after the war when Nigeria became even much more 
financially buoyant as her oil resources contributed enormous 
foreign currency to her coffers than hitherto, and the country 
was able to play a confident and much more dynamic role in 
world affairs (Ajala, 1993).  
 
The Murtala Mohammed government (1975-1976) that 
overthrew the Gowon administration through a coup was, 
right from the outset, prepared to take radical measures in 
Africa’s decolonization process. The Angolan crisis of 1975 
provided an opportunity for the Nigeria government to 
demonstrate her commitment to the anti-apartheid struggle 
by resolving the political stalemate in the former (Fafowora, 
1984; Ogunsanwo, 1986; Gambari, 2008; Onuoha, 2008; 
Akinboye, 2013). Following the killing of General Mohammed 
in the abortive coup led by Colonel Buka Dimka in July 1976, 
General Olusegun Obasanjo continued the same radical 
approach in the country’s foreign policy relations with South 
Africa. Thus, General Obasanjo’s administration was widely 
perceived as a continuation of Murtala Mohammed 
administration (Nnoli, 1976; Ajala, 1986, Garba, 1987). 
 
In the 1980s, Nigeria-South Africa relations witnessed these 
phases: the civilian administration of Shehu Shagari, and the 
succeeding military administrations of Muhammad Buhari 
and Ibrahim Babangida. Yet there was hardly any difference 
in their pursuit of Nigeria-South Africa relations. For instance, 
the second republic administration of Shehu Shagari (1979-
1983) was encumbered by a number of domestic challenges 
which bordered on its inability to deliver on his electoral 
promises, coupled with sharp decline in oil revenues. These 
two factors largely affected Nigeria-Africa policies and had 
serious implications for Nigeria-South Africa relations. This 
was evident in the administration’s inability to contribute 
financially to the fight against apartheid in South Africa (Ajala, 
1986). 
 
In the short-lived regime of Muhammad Buhari (1983- 1985), 
the Afro-centric foreign policy of the Nigerian government 
  
toward South African apartheid regime was re-vitalized, but 
not without serious opposition from domestic pressure 
groups, which clamoured for improved standard of living for 
citizens rather than rendering assistance to other African 
countries. Therefore, the only appreciable impact of Nigeria-
South Africa relations under Buhari regime was the hosting of 
the second international conference on apartheid, tagged; 
‘Legal Status of the Apartheid Regime’ held in Lagos, Nigeria, 
August 1984. In the conference, apartheid was declared 
illegal and the result further heightened the pressure on 
apartheid regime in South Africa, and re-enforced Nigeria’s 
determination to eradicate all vestiges of racist regimes in 
Africa (Ajala, 1986). 
 
Apartheid regime in South Africa would appear to have been 
effectively tackled under Babangida’s regime (1985-1993). 
The UN Anti-Apartheid Committee which had enjoyed 
Nigerian headship for the better part of its existence 
continued its vigorous campaigns against apartheid. At the 
level of the Non-Aligned Movement, the dying tempo of 
decolonization was revived with a resolution for the 
establishment of an African Fund at the Harare Conference in 
1986, to assist the liberation of Southern Africa as a whole, 
and at the Paris International Conference for sanctions 
against apartheid in 1987. Nigeria, in addition to her usual 
financial support, opted for tougher sanctions against the 
apartheid regime in South Africa (Saliu, 2006). 
However, it is important to note that the requirements of 
economic diplomacy compromised Babangida’s famous stand 
on apartheid. For instance, Nigeria hosted the then apartheid 
President Frederick De Klerk in Abuja in 1992 despite the 
reversible steps taken by the apartheid state towards 
reforms. In essence, Babangida regime’s rhetorical approach 
was a mere ploy to redeem the discredited image of his 
regime (Saliu, 2006:305). 
 
From the foregoing, it is clear that Nigeria’s policy towards 
South Africa between 1960 and 1993 was characterized by 
the former’s disdain of the latter’s apartheid policy. Although 
Nigeria, from independence, maintained a hostile attitude 
towards South Africa for more than thirty years until the early 
1990s, both countries established formal diplomatic relations 
on 21 February 1994 following the termination of apartheid 
policy, release of the African National Congress (ANC) leader, 
Nelson Mandela and conduct of general elections in South 
Africa. Prior to this time, Nigeria Mission was operating 
through the Angolan High Commission in Pretoria. 
Subsequently, an exchange of High Commissioners was done 
by the two countries, with each acutely conscious of the fact 
that both countries need each other’s support in the mutually 
advantageous conduct of their bilateral relations and 
multilateral diplomacy in Africa (Akindele, 2007).  
 
The post-1994 Nigeria-South Africa relations began with a 
major disagreement over Nigeria’s domestic policy. General 
Sani Abacha’s dictatorial military regime (1993-1998), and its 
decision to hang Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight Ogoni men on 10 
November 1995, provided the first occasion for an open 
diplomatic strain in the relationship between Nigeria and 
South Africa in the aftermath of apartheid era. Consequent 
upon the alleged role of South Africa in the suspension of 
Nigeria from the Commonwealth at the Auckland Summit in 
November 1995, the Nigerian state retaliated this diplomatic 
offensive by severing diplomatic relations with South Africa 
(Zabadi, 2004; Ibeanu and Nwachukwu, 2004; Saliu, 2006; 
Akindele, 2007; Akinterinwa, 2009). The frosty relationship 
between the two countries was consequently amended by 
the military regime of Abdusallam Abubakar whose 
reconciliatory trip to South Africa marked the beginning of a 
relatively new relationship between the two countries. 
 
By the year 1999, Nigeria and South Africa began to redefine 
their bilateral and multilateral relationships, more so as this 
period coincided with democratic transitions in both 
countries. In essence, the period since 1999, ushered in an 
era of strategic bilateral dealings which heralded the 
formation of Nigeria-South Africa Bi-National Commission, 
inaugurated in October 1999 (Akinboye, 2005; Akindele, 
2007). Indeed, the period between 2000 and 2005 witnessed 
a more focused and active articulation of a strategic 
partnership between Nigeria and South Africa due largely to 
the perceived challenges of Africa in a rapidly globalizing 
world. The personality of then Nigeria’s President, Olusegun 
Obasanjo and his South African counterpart, Thabo Mbeki, 
was a major contributing factor to the emerging and cordial 
relationship between the two countries. Obasanjo and Mbeki 
perceived the urgent need for Africa’s re-birth and they 
shared equal passion for the realization of such goal (Adebajo 
and Landsberg, 2003). 
 
Keying in to the re-awakening of Pan-African consciousness 
and regional role conception by Nigeria and South Africa after 
the end of Cold War in 1989, there were concerns in policy 
and scholarly circles on the need for the two countries to play 
major roles in conflict mitigation and peace-building in war-
torn African countries. This was moreover in view of the fact 
that Western countries and United Nations began to 
challenge African governments to help resolve regional 
conflicts in the continent. This new stance was fuelled by the 
repeated complaint at the United Nations about the shortage 
of funds to finance peace-keeping operations (Benneh, 2001). 
 
Another major collaborative effort by Nigeria and South 
Africa in promoting continental renaissance was the 
facilitation of the diplomatic process that transformed the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union 
(AU) in 1999. Nigeria and South Africa were also instrumental 
to the formation of Africa’s new development initiative, the 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 2001, 
and its governance tool; African Peer Review Mechanism 
(APRM) in 2003. The expectations by the international 
community, since the year 2000, that Africans and the 
  
continental political leadership should look inwards to solve 
their problems made these initiatives very important and 
timely (NEPAD, 2001).  
 
In a more recent time, Nigeria-South Africa diplomatic 
relations has deteriorated on many fronts, prompting the visit 
of President Goodluck Jonathan to South Africa where he 
addressed the latter’s joint parliament. The Presidential visit 
was prompted by the yellow fever certificate saga that 
involved both countries. The South African government had 
on March 2, 2012 deported 125 Nigerians (75 aboard South 
African Airways) and (50 aboard Arik Air Ways) for possessing 
fake yellow fever vaccination cards (The Guardian Editorials, 
March 5, 2012:3). The Nigerian government had immediately 
retaliated what was generally perceived as unfair treatment 
of Nigerians, indeed an affront to diplomatic norms, by 
deporting a total of 128 South Africans within two days, citing 
‘lack of proper documentation’ as reasons for shutting them 
out (The News Editorials, March 19, 2012:50).  
 
In a related development, the arms deal that involved both 
countries which came on the heels of the collapse of a 
building at the Synagogue of All Nations Church, Lagos, a 
Nigeria-based religious centre, claiming the lives of about 84 
South African nationals became the latest in the ranks of 
diplomatic embarrassment that has bedeviled  the Nigeria-
South relations. According to Kayode (2014:97) failure on the 
part of the Nigerian government to officially declare the cash 
of 9.3 million USD, loaded into a Nigerian-owned jet to the 
South African Customs as required by the latter’s law 
attracted negative diplomatic reaction from the South African 
government. He argued that the seizure of the cash in the 
custody of the Nigerian intelligence officials who had 
attempted to purchase arms through the “black market” 
allegedly for the prosecution of war on terror and insurgents 
did not violate any international practice in the field of 
security and intelligence. He concluded that the diplomatic 
row engendered by the incident in Nigeria-South Africa 
relations only portrayed the hypocrisy in the international 
security architecture. 
 
From the above analysis, it is evident that the history of 
Nigeria-South Africa relations has vacillated between 
cooperation and conflict, necessitated by each country’s 
foreign policy, regime type, domestic intricacies and 
international diplomacy. We now turn our attention to 
specific cases of xenophobic attack on Nigerians in South 
Africa. 
Literature Review 
ANTECEDENT OF MIGRATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The act of cross-border migration has taken different 
various forms. At one end of the gamut is the highly regulated 
and formalized mine contract-labor system established 
between 1890 and 1920, which continues today. At the other 
are various kinds of informal or unregulated movements 
across borders. South Africa has received both kinds of   
migrants for decades. Commercial farmers also relied heavily 
on outside labor, much of it clandestine. The apartheid state 
channeled unauthorized migrants to commercial farms by 
offering them the option of working on farms or being 
deported. (Crush, 2008). 
 
Xenophobia is becoming a prominent aspect of life in 
Africa. From Kenya to the Maghreb and across Southern 
Africa, discrimination against non-nationals, particularly 
fellow Africans, has been on the rise according to 
international media reports. 
However, Crush (2008) states that exclusion, based on the 
idea of being 'non-native' has existed in Africa since 
independence (and was codified during colonialism). 
Bounded ideas of citizenship have existed in Africa for two 
centuries, and contemporary xenophobia can be seen as one 
of the most recent manifestations of this feature. 
South Africa is extremely high with regular attacks on 
foreign nationals. Despite a lack of directly comparable data, 
xenophobia in South Africa is perceived to have significantly 
increased after the installation of a democratic government in 
1994. According to a 2004 study published by the Southern 
Africa Migration Project (SAMP), The ANC government, in its 
attempts to overcome the divides of the past and build new 
forms of social cohesion embarked on an aggressive and 
inclusive nation-building project. One unanticipated by-
product of this project has been a growth in intolerance 
towards outsiders. Violence against foreign citizens and 
African refugees has become increasingly common and 
communities are divided by hostility and suspicion (SAMP, 
2004).  
Xenophobia is a dislike and/o fear of that which is 
unknown or different from one. It comes from the Greek 
words (xenos), meaning “stranger,” “foreigner” and (Phobos), 
and meaning “fear.” The term is typically used to describe a 
fear or dislike foreigners or of people significantly different 
from oneself, usually in the context of visibly differentiated 
minorities (Shinsana,2008). It is more broadly defined in the 
Dictionary of Psychology (1978) as “a fear of strangers”. 
 
The violence and unrest accompanying the xenophobic 
attacks, which took place in May, 2008, left more than 50 
people dead and thousands displaces in locales across South 
Africa. More than sixteen thousands people, including 
Nigerians living in Gauteng alone were forced to find 
alternative living arrangements. According to most reports, 
the attacks began in Alexandra then spread to other areas in 
and around Johannesburg, including Cleveland, Diepsloot, Hill 
brow, Tembisa, Primrose, Ivory Park and Thokoza. Violence in 
Kwazulu-Natal, Mpumalanga and Cape Town soon followed. 
Two patterns emerged in the violence that unfolded. Firstly, 
the violence was largely, although not exclusively, carried out 
against migrants from other African countries, especially 
Nigerians and not all foreigners in general. The term 
’xenophobic’ violence was widely used to describe the 
violence to apply to groups of people who may be within or 
  
outside a society, but who are not considered part of that 
society (Harris,2002). 
 
One of the most striking features of the outbreak of anti-
foreigner violence is just how unsurprising, it actually is. A 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) report of 1998 for example 
stated that “South Africa’s public culture has become 
increasingly xenophobic, and politicians often make 
inflammatory statements that the “deluge” of migrants is 
responsible for the current crime wave, rising unemployment, 
or even the spread of diseases. As the unfounded perceptions 
that migrants are responsible for a variety of social ills grows, 
migrants have increasingly become the targets of abuse at 
hands of the police, the army, and the Department of Home 
Affairs. It is also noted that refugees and asylum seekers with 
distinctive features from far-away countries are especially 
targeted for abuse (HRW 1998: 4). 
 
Another analyst extends the description of xenophobia by 
observing that: An examination of this phenomenon and its 
manifestation reveals that ‘the foreigner’ has become site for 
the violent convergence of a host of unresolved social 
tensions. The difficulties of transition, socio-economic 
frustrations, a legacy of racial division, and an inherited 
culture of violence are just some of the factors contributing 
to violent xenophobia in South Africa today (Valji, 2003). 
It is important to keep in mind that violence perpetrated 
against Nigerians was documented a s early as 1994. In a 
study on Congolese and Nigerians migrants in Johannesburg, 
Morris (1998: 1120) noted for instance that “the increase in 
the size of the foreign population in South Africa has been 
accompanied by a substantial growth of xenophobia and 
numerous attacks on foreigners have been reported (Weekly 
Mail and Guardian, 23 September 1994: Weekly Mail and 
Guardian, 3 February 1995)”. He added that some of the 
most virulent prejudice has been directed against black 
Africans originating from countries north of Southern Africa. 
Another reference to South Africa’s past experience with 
anti-Nigerian violence which resonates in the present 
circumstances was also made by Minaar and Hough 1996 
(cited in Croucher 1998:646); “One frequently cited example 
occurred in December 1994 and again in January 1995, when 
armed youths in Alexandra township carried out attacks 
against suspected illegal aliens _ destroying homes and 
property, and marching suspected illegal aliens to a local 
police station to demand their immediate and forcible 
removal….”. Alexandra has since been a center site of recent 
xenophobic violence. 
     For instance, President Mugabe sent buses to convey 
Zimbabweans back home. The same was done by the 
Mozambicans, Malawians, Swazis and Kenyans governments, 
just to name a few. Nigerian president; Yar’Adua, visited 
South Africa as a result of the attacks to ensure that the lives 
of his citizens were secured and also demanded that affected 
Nigerians receive compensation.  
The South African President, Zuma describes this growing 
xenophobia in South Africa way, Behind any conflict, whether 
it is in northern Ireland, the Balkans, Sudan, genocide in 
Rwanda, apartheid in South Africa, problems in the middle 
east between Israel and Palestine, you are sure to find racism, 
racial discrimination, xenophobic or a related intolerance.  
South Africa’s long track-record of violence as a means of 
protest and the targeting of foreigners in particular; and, the 
documented tensions over migration policy and the scale of 
repatriation serve a very good explanation for its xenophobia. 
It was clear that while most of the attacks were directed 
against foreign, primarily African, migrants, that this was not 
the rule. Attacks were also noted against Chinese-speakers, 
Pakistani migrants as well as against South Africans from 
minority language groups (in the conflict areas) such as those 
who speak sePedi and isiTsonga. The current wave of violence 
has extended beyond a simple conception of foreign versus 
indigenous, by traversing the spectrum of ethnicity, 
indigeneity, citizenship and even legal status (legitimacy). 
Settlements that have recently experienced the expression of 
‘xenophobic’ violence have also been the site of violent and 
other forms of protest around other issues, most notably 
service delivery. Hence, the failure of government in service 
delivery was vexed on the form of xenophobia 
As regards Nigerians, about 50 people died and tens of 
thousands of people have been displaced as a result of 
xenophobic violence in South Africa during 2008. Many 
Nigerians lost their properties, families and others living in 
fear of a resurgent attack. 
The worst implication of this xenophobic attack is the fact 
that the victims are legitimate migrants with responsible 
business. They pose no immediate or remote danger to their 
South African attackers. This raises a number of concerns 
about the safety of Nigerians studying and living in South 
Africa. It is not clear why foreign African migrants, especially 
Nigerians studying and living in South Africa. It is not clear 
why foreign African migrants, especially Nigerians are the 
targets of violence in informal settlements. The timing, 
location and scale of the xenophobic attack cannot be clearly 
explained by the government inability to deal with the 
problem, posing a more serious danger to the Nigerians living 
in that country. The main drivers behind the violence are 
pervasive belief by the South Africa that foreigners make life 
difficult for them but the severity in those against Nigerians 
can be disturbing. 
According to Crush (2008) the expansion and consolidation 
of South Africa's economic relations with the rest of the 
continent are also reflected in these figures. Small-scale 
entrepreneurs involved in cross-border trade, particularly 
those who come to South Africa to source goods to sell in 
their home countries, usually travel on visitor's permits. Thus, 
the increase in the issue of visitor's permits to Africans 
reflects a change in trading patterns and the growth in small- 
and medium-scale entrepreneurs involved in formal and 
informal cross-border trade.  
By contrast, levels of immigration fell dramatically in the 
1990s. The number of people granted permanent residence 
  
declined from around 14,000 per year at the beginning of the 
decade to 3,053 in 2000 (see Table I). (Crush, 2008). 
However, the proportion of immigrants from Africa did 
increase over the decade, with Africans making up nearly half 
of all immigrants in both 2003 and 2004. Between 1990 and 
2004, a total of 110,000 legal immigrants entered the 
country, 27 percent of whom were from other African 
countries. 
TABLE I  
LEGAL IMMIGRATION TO SOUTH AFRICA, 1990-2005 
 
Year 
Legal 
immigrants 
African 
immigrants 
% African 
immigrants 
1990 14,499 1,628 11.2 
1991 12,379 2,065 16.7 
1992 8,686 1,266 14.6 
1993 9,824 1,701 17.3 
1994 6,398 1,628 25.4 
1995 5,064 1,343 26.5 
1996 5,407 1,601 29.6 
1997 4,102 1,281 31.2 
1998 4,371 1,169 26.7 
1999 3,669 980 26.7 
2000 3,053 831 27.2 
2001 4,832 1,584 32.8 
2002 6,545 2,472 37.8 
2003 10,578 4,961 46.9 
2004 10,714 5,235 48.9 
Total 110,121 29,745 27 
TABLE I Source: Department of Home Affairs annual reports; 
Statistics South Africa Tourism & Migration reports, PS015. 
 
Suffice it to say that the policy of reductionism contributes 
to the reduction in the migration in the migration of people 
into South Africa. In essence, contrary to the predictions of 
many, no massive brain drain to South Africa from elsewhere 
on the continent took place.  
 Crush (2008) later emphasized that after 1994, the 
number of people entering legally on temporary work 
permits also declined. In 1996, 52,704 work permits were 
issued, a number that fell to 15,834 in 2000. The decrease in 
the issue and reissue of temporary work permits had little to 
do with labour market demand and everything to do with 
government policy. Employers found it more and more 
difficult to hire abroad, even temporarily, and foreign 
workers found themselves enmeshed in Home Affairs red 
tape.  
The restrictionist immigration and migration policy was at 
odds with another reality that South Africa, along with many 
other developing countries, has had to face: brain drain. 
South Africa has been shedding skills at an alarming rate to its 
global competitors, especially in the industrial, medical, and 
education fields.  Official emigration statistics do not capture 
the full dimensions of the brain drain. Statistics South Africa, 
for example, recorded a total of 92,612 people (including 
20,038 with professional qualifications) emigrating between 
1989 and 2003 to five main destination countries: the United 
Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand.  
However, the destination-country statistics of immigrant 
arrivals from South Africa show 80,831 professionals and 
368,829 total immigrants arriving from South Africa during 
the same time period. Official statistics therefore 
undercounted the loss by around three-quarters.  
Recent studies of the health sector conducted by SAMP 
showed massive discontent with virtually all aspects of 
working and living conditions. The vast majority of health 
professionals expressed an intense desire to leave South 
Africa. Around 8 percent of a national sample said they would 
probably leave within six months, 25 percent within two 
years, and half (52 percent) within five years.  
The South African gold mining industry entered a period of 
renewed expansion after 2000. The mining companies fought 
hard to keep their right to hire foreign contract workers 
without government interference. Earlier drafts of the 2002 
Immigration Act were modified to accommodate this lobby.  
However, the 2002 Immigration Act still made it more 
difficult for the mining companies to hire foreign workers. 
They now must apply for "corporate permits" which, once the 
government grants the permits, allow them to import a 
specified number of foreign workers.  
 
 
Selected Case Study Analyses on Xenophobia in South Africa 
According to a 1998 Human Rights Watch Report (cited in 
Olupohunda, 2013:5), immigrants from Malawi, Zimbabwe 
and Mozambique living in the Alexandra Township near 
Johannesburg were physically assaulted over a period of 
several weeks in 1995, as armed gangs identified suspected 
migrants and marched them to the police station in an 
attempt to “clean the township of foreigners.” The 
campaigners, known as “Buyelekhaya” (go back home), 
blamed foreigners for crime, unemployment and sexual 
attacks.  
In September 1998 a Mozambican and two Senegalese were 
thrown out of a train. The assault was carried out by a group 
returning from a rally that blamed foreigners for 
unemployment, crime and spreading AIDS. In 2000 seven 
foreigners were killed on the Cape Flats over a five-week 
period in what police described as xenophobic murders 
  
possibly motivated by the fear that outsiders would claim 
property belonging to locals. In October 2001 residents of the 
Zandspruit informal settlement gave Zimbabweans 10 days to 
leave the area. When the foreigners failed to leave voluntarily 
they were forcefully evicted and their shacks were burned 
down and looted. Community members said they were angry 
that Zimbabweans were employed while locals remained 
jobless and blamed the foreigners for a number of crimes. No 
injuries were reported among the Zimbabweans (Konanani 
and Odeku, 2013) 
In the last week of 2005 and first week of 2006 at least four 
people, including two Zimbabweans, died in the 
Olievenhoutbosch settlement after foreigners were blamed 
for the death of a local man. Shacks belonging to foreigners 
were set alight and locals demanded that police remove all 
immigrants from the area. In August 2006 Somali refugees 
appealed for protection after 21 Somali traders were killed in 
July of that year and 26 more in August. The immigrants 
believed the murders to be motivated by xenophobia, 
although police rejected the assertion of a concerted 
campaign to drive Somali traders out of townships in the 
Western Cape. Attacks on foreign nationals increased 
markedly in late 2007 and it is believed that there were at 
least a dozen attacks between January and May 2008. The 
most severe incidents occurred on 8 January 2008 when two 
Somali shop owners were murdered in the Eastern Cape 
towns of Jeffreys Bay and East London and in March 2008 
when seven people were killed including Zimbabweans, 
Pakistanis and a Somali after their shops and shacks were set 
alight in Atteridgeville near Pretoria (Abdi, 2013). 
The most severe incident occurred in 2008 when a series of 
riots started in the township of Alexandra.  Locals attacked 
migrants from Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe, and 
Nigeria. In recent years, tales of xenophobic attacks on 
Nigerians living in South Africa have left compatriots at home 
in shock. There have also been reported cases of harassment 
of Nigerian travellers arriving at the Oliver Thambo Airport. 
One celebrated case of disrespect was the treatment of 
Africa’s first Nobel winner, Prof. Wole Soyinka. In 2005, 
Soyinka was denied entry into South Africa. It took the last 
minute intervention of Mandela’s wife, Graca Machel, to 
admit the Nobel Laureate into the country. Soyinka’s trip to 
South Africa which was in response to an invitation to deliver 
a lecture in honour of Mandela drew national and 
international focus to the country, both because of Mandela, 
whose birthday it was and Soyinka who was the guest 
speaker (Olupohunda, 2013). 
The South African government has also indirectly promoted 
and encouraged its citizens into believing that immigrants are 
responsible for unemployment and crimes.  For example, 
South Africa’s borders have been remilitarised. According to 
Christopher McMichael (cited in Olupohunda, 2013:5): “This 
shared state-corporate project of building up a ‘fortress 
South Africa’ also reveals a deeply entrenched seam of 
xenophobia, in which undocumented migrants and refugees 
from African countries are painted as a security risk akin to 
terrorism and organised crime. Parliamentary discussions on 
border security are rife with claims that foreign nationals are 
attempting to drain social grants and economic opportunities 
from citizens. The packaging of illegal immigration as a 
national security threat, which often relies on 
unsubstantiated claims about the inherent criminality of 
foreign nationals, provides an official gloss on deeply 
entrenched governmental xenophobia, in which African 
immigrants are targets for regular harassment, rounding up 
and extortion by the police. This normalisation of immigrants 
as figures of resentment may also fuel outbreaks of 
xenophobic violence’’ (Olupohunda, 2013). 
In May, 2013 Reports of spontaneous assault by some South 
African members of Port Nolloth community were said to 
have targeted the Nigerian community living in the area. They 
were reportedly chased out of their homes, their property 
looted and their shops burnt. The attackers have always 
accused the Nigerians of dealing in drugs. But the Nigerian 
community in South Africa has denied the allegation. 
Consequently, President Jacob Zuma of South Africa and his 
counterpart in Nigeria, President Goodluck Jonathan initiated 
high level diplomacy to repair the damage brought about by 
the incident (Abdi, 2013). In short, Abdi (2013) has asserted 
that, in view of the rate of xenophobic violence in South 
Africa, coupled with other recorded rape violence, the 
country qualifies as one of the most violent societies in the 
world. 
Conclusion and Recommendations  
The paper focused on the retrospective discourse on 
xenophobia in South Africa, pointing attention to its effects 
on contemporary Nigeria-South Africa diplomatic relations. It 
demonstrated that xenophobia in South Africa is rooted in 
the nature and character of apartheid and its discriminatory 
policies against the black majority which incidentally denied 
them of economic opportunities, ultimately fuelling the 
attitude of suspicion and hate for foreigners. The paper 
further suggested that the mercantilist and imperialistic 
ambition of the apartheid South African government which 
attracted huge menial labour from the Southern African 
region to service the growing mining industry in the former 
accounted for xenophobic violence that has bedevilled the 
post-apartheid South African society. The paper further 
observed that the targeted xenophobic attacks by South 
Africans against Nigerians are borne out fear for the 
entrepreneurial ambition of the latter and their tendency to 
dominate a given environment. The paper concludes that the 
political economy of the post-apartheid South African society 
is such that the distortions inherent in the deeply divided 
society will warrant the continuation of xenophobia until this 
anomaly is addressed.  
  
It therefore recommends the strengthening of regional and 
sub-regional organizations like the African Union (AU) and the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
respectively to ensure the total dismantling of all the 
apartheid structures that still manifest in form of regional 
ambitions and economic imperialism. This will facilitate the 
rapid disintegration of the economies of the smaller Southern 
African countries from the dominant South African economy 
and ensure equitable trade balances between the 
neighbouring countries. Again, the government of South 
Africa must intensify efforts to empower the black population 
in the post-apartheid South Africa in other to resolve the 
contradictions of apartheid and ensure a free society for all. 
Similarly, the white minority that hold the commanding 
heights of the post-apartheid South African economy must 
show the willingness to open the space for competition and 
inclusion. 
In the particular case involving Nigeria-South Africa relations, 
both countries must strengthen the instrumentality of the 
Nigeria-South Africa Bi-National Commission as a veritable 
platform to resolve diplomatic impasses speedily before they 
degenerate into avoidable row. In the same vein, Nigeria and 
South Africa must move above rhetoric and embrace their 
continental responsibility of Africa’s development and 
renaissance.  
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